How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence

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The author offers a nice, four-part critical thinking approach in the first section of the book and warns about cognitive biases in the second section. In particular, Omand has observations about cyber interference in elections and other aspects of public life which should probably be read more than once. The book offers some useful lessons and formulae, but fails to go further in the nitty gritty of how an intelligent analyst uses these best. As a securocrat, it makes sense for him to primarily be occupied with the downsides of the digitalisation of our lives. How Spies Think’ by Sir David Omand is an insight into how senior intelligence officials make decisions, anticipate threats, maximise opportunities and build strategic partnerships.

jest wprowadzić człowieka w błąd, a w dzisiejszym cyfrowym świecie, łatwo jest manipulować informacjami i łatwo je nagłaśnieć. Wie belang stelt in het werk van inlichtingendiensten en van hun interactie met beleidsmakers en besluitvormers kan, kortom, niet om dit boek heen. Hij gaat daarbij voorbij aan het gegeven dat de inspanningen van goedwillende, integere mensen nog geen garantie geven op een goed resultaat. There are attempts to organize the author's thinking in a systematic manner for the benefit of the reader.As a librarian I was intrigued to discover that skills used by 'spies' are often put in to play by librarians the world over. When negotiating, nothing is agreed until everything is, so always set a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) – this is your backstop if proceedings collapse.

I suspect the publisher thinks that being a spy is sexier than being an analyst, so using "spies" makes sense from a marketing perspective. Overall, I enjoyed reading the book, and I did learn a few nuggets that I will take with me in my thinking about critical thinking. Als directeur van GCHQ, het Britse equivalent van de Amerikaanse National Security Agency, zou hij in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn organisatie als een van de eerste inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten het internettijdperk inleiden. My biggest take aways are the desire to take a course in logic (get more practice with Bayesian Inference) and go with the theory that has the least factors seeming to disprove it - not the one with the most supporting evidence. There are some really useful lessons in here, especially the final lesson on digital subversion and sedition and that seeing is not always believing, especially with the sophisticated.

Both have a similar kind of message that one needs to be careful with the world when surrounded and bombarded with information from various sources, with various degrees of freedom and truthfulness. I can imagine that the publishers were dazzled by the author's background and qualifications: a former director of GCHQ, seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee, permanent secretary at the Home Office and a professor of war studies. He lectures, we never know why we think in such a pattern and the patterns are nothing but our demons influences and based on that we jump into predetermined solutions.

I didn't find too much more insight than that which you could find in any intelligence text book, as this is more about Intel analysts than spies on the ground. Each lesson is grounded in case studies such as the UK’s flawed anticipation of the Falklands invasion in 1982.These snippets of a true story help demonstrate the message of each 'lesson' and add a little colour to what is otherwise a fairly dry read.