The result was the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921, a formative experience for both the Soviet state and its Red Army. During 1918 and 1919, V.I. Lenin and his commissar for military affairs, L. D. Trotsky, used the railroad lines to shuttle their limited reserves from place to place, staving off defeat time after time. This became known as echelon war, in which large forces were shifted by railroad (echelon) to reinforce successively threatened fronts. Some infantry divisions were shifted between fronts as many as five times in the course of the war. This experience gave all participants an abiding sense of the need for strategic reserves and forces arrayed in great depth. The Soviets formed their first two mechanized corps in the fall of 1932, three years before Germany created its first panzer divisions. Over the next several years, the number and complexity of armored, mechanized, and airborne formations grew steadily. Airborne forces, in particular, were elite units, composed in large part of dedicated Communists who had learned to parachute in the Komsomol youth organization. Large-scale exercises tested the theory of combined mechanized and airborne offensives. At the same time, the rest of the Red Army gradually shifted to regular-cadre composition, eliminating the mixed territorialcadre system. By 1 June 1938, the Red Army was a full-time force of 1.5 million men. M. Glantz的作品初次引進，而如今現在他的所有作品相信不是已經出版就是在翻譯中了。簡體書市對Glantz 重視也不是沒來由的。此公年近半百從美軍中退役，初次與人合著這本《巨人的碰撞》就展露頭角，聲名大噪。此後他關於蘇德戰爭的作品如雨後春筍般一部一部冒出，更是在歐美學界引起不小話題。

When Titans Clashed by David M. Glantz eBook | Perlego [PDF] When Titans Clashed by David M. Glantz eBook | Perlego

The subtitle of the book (above) is discussed at length in the authors’ Conclusion. On the 50th anniversary of the Normandy Invasion of 1944, a U.S. news magazine featured a cover photo of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was labelled the man who defeated Hitler. If any one man deserved that label, it was not Eisenhower, but Zhukov, Vasilevsky, or possibly Stalin himself. More generally, the Red Army and the Soviet citizenry of many nationalities bore the lion’s share of the struggle against Germany from 1941 to 1945 …After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel. I kind of wish more time was spend on the personalities involved, he does some of that at places, but it's mostly very dry and in-personal new members join The Citadel faculty". Citadel News Service. August 26, 2008. Archived from the original on December 4, 2019 . Retrieved February 18, 2015. Speedy, coherent and picturesque this book is a classic. A must must read for those interested in an in-depth knowledge of the Eastern Front.

When Titans clashed by David M. Glantz | Open Library When Titans clashed by David M. Glantz | Open Library

The author tries to discount the importance of this number in explaining things to focus on what to be fair is probably the main reason they lost but I find with the other factors a very important aspect. Specially considering that it's not just the number itself but the fact that Russia was able to maintain that number despite incredibly high losses.Battle for the Ukraine: The Korsun'-Shevchenkovskii Operation (Soviet (Russian) Study of War), Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 ISBN 0-7146-5278-4 Glantz 在結論時說了，儘管盟軍在西線確實發揮了側面牽制的作用，並且提供大量的戰略物資支援，但如果沒有斯拉夫民族付出了成千上萬的人命，是不可能擊敗納粹的。兩位作者對於紅軍的貢獻，是不吝於指出的。 Now, Western readers can learn for the first time the full extent of the Soviet achievement. Essential reading for anyone wanting to know the true story of how the Red Army snatched victory in 1945 from the jaws of defeat in 1941."— Washington Post Book World A full account of the Soviet army's triumph over the German army, from the Soviet perspective. Draws on formerly classified Soviet sources to place the war within its wider political, economic, and social contexts, and recounts the offensives and counteroffensives sweeping across a half-million square miles. Includes b&w photos and maps. For general readers interested in WWII and Soviet history. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com) Col. David Glantz has made a name for himself in the military history community by bringing to light battles and campaigns, unknown largely in the West (though perhaps still remembered by some in Germany), that took place in the Eastern Front during WWII. In this book Glantz teamed up with Jonathan House to write a succinct, yet still detailed, overall history of the Eastern Front. What makes this book so unique, at least at the time 20 years ago when it came out, was it's focus on the Soviet side of the equation.

When titans clashed : how the Red Army stopped Hitler When titans clashed : how the Red Army stopped Hitler

Glantz and House’s work also highlights that it was the Soviets who developed what we today know as “operational art.” The size forces necessary to conduct the penetrations and encirclements envisioned by Tukhachevsky (and later perfected by officers such as G. K. Zhukov) demanded an intellectual framework to manage the challenges of distance and logistics. Hence, we see the Soviets give birth to operational art as a bridge to link together tactical action with strategic objectives on the battlefield. To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April–August 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1) (Modern War Studies) with Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 2009 This book, a project of 'Modern War Studies' and published by the University Press of Kansas, is exactly, completely and meticulously what it purports to be: a day by day account of the positions, plans, movements, strength, armaments, and commanders of the two armies, Wermacht and Red throughout the almost 4 year battle across Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia. If, for research or curiosity, you need to know the casualty figures for each army group in the battle for Kursk in 1943, you will find it here. Also every other battle on Hitler's eastern front. This book is the encyclopedia of battle for Stalin's Great Patriotic War; it is not an engaging tale of personal heroism and sacrifice. In fact, there are no developed characters except for Hitler, Stalin, and a handful of top-ranked generals on either side.

Lccn 95024588 Ocr tesseract 4.1.1 Ocr_converted abbyy-to-hocr 1.1.4 Ocr_detected_lang en Ocr_detected_lang_conf 1.0000 Ocr_detected_script Latin Ocr_module_version 0.0.12 Ocr_parameters -l eng Openlibrary OL22609427M Openlibrary_edition Good read on the war in the Eastern Front and the emergence of Soviet operational art to defeat Germany. As an American it’s easy to look at WW2 through an ethnocentric lens that predominantly highlights western actions as the ultimate cause of Hitlers demise (Normandy, Battle of Bulge, etc). In an era of retrenchment, one of the few sources of funds and equipment for weapons experimentation was the secret Soviet-German military collaboration agreements. The two former enemies shared both a fear of Poland and a desire to circumvent the restrictions placed on them by the western allies of the World War. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) forbade Germany to possess tanks, poison gas, and aircraft, but, for a decade after 1921, the German army and government provided funds and technical assistance to produce and test such weapons in the Soviet Union. Both sides gained the opportunity to test equipment they could not otherwise have produced, but the actual number of such weapons was relatively small.