Chapter 23 - The New Zealand Cruisers". Royal New Zealand Navy . http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Navy-c23.html . Retrieved 2 September 2012. In June, the IJA developed a plan for a major offensive in the Indian Ocean, including an invasion of Ceylon. The Germans were advancing in North Africa, which made an Axis link-up in the Middle East attractive. Resource constraints forced the IJN to reject it, especially once the Guadalcanal Campaign started. [56]

However I am going to go on a tangent here and contradict that point of view, there are no really good books (that I have found) about the Hawker Tempest V that beat reading pilots notes or performance data found online. While every book on the Spitfire regurgitates the same old dreary narrative. Id like more objectivity and analysis in military books but I think the vast majority of readers wouldnt.. Four of the five battleships were of the R class: Revenge, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, and Resolution, all World War I veterans, were slow and weak compared to their Japanese opponents. The only British battleship that could match the Japanese was the modernized HMS Warspite, which had fought at Jutland. Not even the British cruisers were the equal of the Japanese—four of them had been laid down during World War I.

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The Japanese did not exploit their victory as the British feared. The decision to postpone major operations in the Indian Ocean was upheld. The Japanese aircraft carriers required maintenance and replenishment after months of intensive operations, [57] and there was already difficulty in maintaining the strength of frontline air units. [58] Nagumo and officers such as Mitsuo Fuchida (commanding Akagi's air group) felt that the losses inflicted on the British did not justify the loss of experienced Japanese air crews. [59] Japanese attention also lay elsewhere. In early May, Japanese carriers fought the Battle of the Coral Sea in the southwest Pacific, [57] followed in June by the Battle of Midway. [56] In both cases, losses constrained Japanese options further.

Shortly after 06:00 [29] Nagumo's force began launching 91 bombers and 36 fighters for the strike on Colombo. [19] British early warning failed to detect and identify the incoming strike, [30] forcing British pilots to scramble under fire when the first Japanese aircraft appeared over them at 07:45. The effective defence of the Ratmalana airbase by British fighters [31] left the harbour exposed. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, [32] the Norwegian tanker Soli [33] and the old destroyer HMS Tenedos were sunk; three other ships were damaged. The port was damaged [32] but was not put out of action. [19] 20 of the 41 British fighters that took off were destroyed. [16] At least one fighter was damaged and made incapable of flight while attempting to take off. The six Swordfish of 788 NAS arrived during the battle and were shot down. [25] The Japanese lost seven aircraft. [16] The Eastern Fleet transferred its main base to Kilindini, Kenya in East Africa, temporarily ceding the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese; from there it continued contesting control of the central Indian Ocean on better terms. [50] Force A, including its two aircraft carriers, Indomitable and Formidable, retired to Bombay, [3] and Somerville regularly deployed a fast carrier force to the central Indian Ocean over the next six months, during which he operated from or near Ceylon for nearly half that time. On 18 April, naval planning accorded the Eastern Fleet the highest priority for reinforcement, which also included transferring most of the carriers from the Home Fleet and the Mediterranean, with the intention of returning to Ceylon in September. [52] Perrett, Bryan (2014). Why the Japanese lost. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military. p.114. ISBN 978-1-78159-198-7. For India, a U.S. naval presence in the eastern Indian Ocean has implications that go beyond the interpretation of U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. As this analyst noted in a recent paper , U.S. freedom of navigation operations normalize military activism (including Chinese operations) near Indian islands that remain vulnerable to incursions by foreign warships in the surrounding seas. The U.S. emphasis on navigational freedoms in the exclusive economic zones encourages warships of other regional navies to violate Indian authority and jurisdiction in the waters off island territories. Since Washington is yet to ratify the U.N. convention, Indian officials aren’t eager to accept U.S. lecturing on the subject of navigational freedoms. With that, the Indian Ocean raid was over. It had been a massive victory for the Japanese, and Fuchida himself saw it as a great victory for air power. “He who controls the air controls the sea—and the world,” he wrote later. “Conventional navy vessels do not have a chance against air power. It is sad to see them sink so helplessly.”

Of the three carriers, two were new—HMS Formidable and HMS Indomitable. Neither carrier was fully worked up and they were operating obsolete aircraft compared to the Japanese and their nimble Zero fighter. Between them, they had 45 Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers and 33 fighters, the latter consisting of 12 Grumman F4F Martlets (the export version of the American Wildcat), 12 Fairey Fulmars, and nine Hawker Sea Hurricanes. The Japanese force, commanded by Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, had a core of five aircraft carriers; Akagi, Shōkaku and Zuikaku in Carrier Division 5, and Sōryū and Hiryū in Carrier Division 2. [1] The carriers were accompanied by all four Kongo-class battleships, and both Tone-class cruisers. [7] Commodore (D), Commanding, Destroyer Flotillas, Eastern Fleet (and later East Indies Fleet) [ edit ] Somerville knew he could not fight the Japanese in daylight, so he turned south to avoid the enemy. For the next few hours, Somerville played hide-and-seek with the Japanese, struggling to avoid their reconnaissance planes. He worried that the Japanese might learn the location of his secret base at Addu Atoll. Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.

Charles Stephenson's well-researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. SeaGull Feb 21 - Apr 21 On 6 April heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya with destroyer Shirakumo sank the British merchant ships Silksworth, Autolycus, Malda and Shinkuang and the American ship Exmoor. [42] [ clarification needed]. From October 1943, the Eastern Fleet was the maritime component of South East Asia Command, including responsibilities beyond the SEAC area. The fleet reached full operational strength again by 1944. On 22 November 1944 the Eastern Fleet was split into the British Pacific Fleet, receiving the majority of the ships, and the remnant, which became known as the East Indies Fleet. [19]

Following the successful Allied landings in France during the summer of 1944, Operation OVERLORD in June and Operation DRAGOON in August, Britain began to reallocate resources to the Far East and the war against Japan. The Japanese had one more small punch to throw at the British. The carrier Ryujo launched airstrikes on Vizagatapan and Cocanada in India, which did little physical damage but frightened the Indian command, setting off an invasion scare that took months to die down. “He Who Controls the Air Controls the Sea- and the World” A well written and absorbing account of the role played by this important but neglected force. Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter Highlight: 'This book gives the British Far East Fleet the recognition it deserves. An authoritative study which will appeal to matelots and landlubbers alike.' FEPOW Family Book Club

At about 16:00 on 4 April, PBY Catalina flying boat (AJ155/QL-A) from the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) 413 Squadron flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall spotted Nagumo's fleet 360 mi (310 nmi; 580 km) south-east of Ceylon [20] [21] on a course that would have entered Somerville's previous patrol area from the south. [23] The Catalina transmitted the sighting, but not the size of the fleet, before being shot down. [21] At this time, Somerville was refuelling at Port T; Force A sailed eastward toward the Japanese upon receiving the sighting; [10] Force B could not be ready until 5 April. [19] Catalina FV-R from 205 Squadron RAF took off at 17:45 to shadow the Japanese fleet, making its first report at 22:37 on 4 April, and a final report at 06:15 on 5 April while 110 mi (96 nmi; 180 km) from Ceylon. FV-R was shot down about 90 minutes after the final report. [20] In a welter of explosions and screeching dive bombers, the Japanese scored hits on the British harbor buildings and other shore installations. They also hit the monitor Erebus and the merchant ship Sagaing, 7,958 tons.Yet voices in India’s strategic community urge caution. After the signing of a defense pact between the United States and the Maldives in September 2020, some Indian analysts counsel the need for New Delhi to hedge against the possibility of an “over-crowding of the neighborhood strategic space in the Indian Ocean.” While they welcome an American forward presence in the Indian Ocean region as a vital hedge against China, some Indian observers believe that an excessive U.S. military presence in the eastern Indian Ocean region could needlessly provoke China, with adverse implications for New Delhi. On 15–16 May 1945, the British fought the Battle of the Malacca Strait; the 26th Destroyer Flotilla (composed of Saumarez, Venus, Verulam, Vigilant and Virago) sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro in the Malacca Straits using torpedoes. [21] Eastern Fleet senior officers [ edit ] Commanders-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet [ edit ] The failure of the Japanese fleet to appear on 1–2 April led Somerville to mistakenly believe that the entirety, rather than a part, of Allied intelligence concerning Operation C was flawed. As a result he detached Cornwall, Dorsetshire, and Hermes, which were subsequently lost after being sent into areas overflown by Japanese aerial reconnaissance. [10]